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NOTES
Civil Procedure-Relation Back of Barred Counterclaims Under
Rule 13(f)
Authority exists for the proposition that the statute of limitations is
more properly used as a shield, rather than a sword.' More often than not,
however, the statute in fact becomes a sword that severs life from a still
viable claim for relief. In Butler v. Poffinberger,2 a federal district court
prevented an omitted counterclaim from falling prey to the statute of limitations through application of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 13 (f) and
15 (c).3
On June 10, 1967, Poffinberger and Butler were injured in an automobile collision. Butler filed suit against Poffinberger and his employer in
a federal district court,4 alleging that Poffinberger's negligence proximately caused his injuries. The attorney who represented both Poffinberger and his employer averred that "'[p]laintiff [Butler] was guilty
of negligence which proximately contributed in whole or in part to the
accident described in the complaint.' " The attorney failed, however,
to set forth a counterclaim for Poffinberger's injuries, assuring him later
that the matter of any countersuit would be taken care of. In May, 1968,
one month before the West Virginia statute of limitations was due to
expire, the attorney notified Poffinberger that he would not handle the
counterclaim. Three months after the statute expired, Poffinberger filed
a motion to amend his answer under rule 13(f).' Finding excusable
neglect and inadvertence in Poffinberger's failure to assert the counterclaim earlier, the court granted leave to set up the counterclaim by amendment under rule 13 (f). Because it " 'arose out of' the precise 'conduct,
transaction, or occurrence' on which the answer focused," 7 the amendment was found to relate back to the date of the answer under rule 15 (c).8
Thus, the terminal effect of the statute of limitations was avoided.
'Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 277 F.2d 615, 623 (10th Cir. 1960).
249 F.R.D. 8 (N.D.W. Va. 1970).
8
FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (f) and 15 (c). See notes 6 and 8 infra.
"Jurisdiction was apparently based on diversity of citizenship.

'49 F.R.D. at 9.
'FED. R. Civ. P. 13(f) provides: "When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim
through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he

may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by amendment."

749 F.R.D. at 10.
'FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) provides: "Whenever the claim or defense asserted in
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In allowing the rule 13 (f) amendment to relate back under rule 15 (c)
the federal district court rejected the reasoning of the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit in Stoner v. Terranella.9 In Stoner, the defendant

wished to assert an omitted counterclaim upon which the statute of limitations had run; he sought leave to amend his answer under rule 15 (a)'"
and argued that the amendment should relate back to the answer under
rule 15 (c). The court of appeals held that amendment under rule 13 (f),
rather than rule 15(a), was the proper method of asserting an omitted
counterclaim." Commenting that rules 13 (f) and 15 (a) were "mutually
exclusive,"' 2 the court added that even had the defendant sought leave to
amend under rule 13 (f), the amendment would not relate back under rule
15 (c). Relation back under rule 15 (c) applied only to amendments made
pursuant to rule 15(a), not rule 13(f). 3
Although the court in Stoner failed to enunciate the motivating
rationale behind the decision, the outcome was most likely justified from
a logical standpoint. The court perhaps noted, sub silentio, that relation
back of rule 13 (f) counterclaims had never before been attempted. 4 Notwithstanding this fact, the court was probably impressed with other cases
holding that rule 13 had no application to counterclaims upon which the
statutory period had elapsed.' Arguably, if rule 13 had no application to
counterclaims barred by the statute of limitations, then rule 15(c) could
not be used in conjunction with rule 13 (f) amendments because the whole
the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth
or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back
to the date of the original pleading."
0372 F.2d 89 (6th Cir. 1967).
" FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides in part: "A party may amend his pleading
once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or,
if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action
has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within
20 days after it is served ....
11372 F.2d at 91.
Id. But see Smith Contr. Corp. v. Trojan Constr. Co., 192 F.2d 234, 236
(10th Cir. 1951) (leave to amend when justice requires under rule 13(f) should
be freely given as required by rule 15(a)); Riss & Co. v. Local 107, Teamsters, 27
F.R.D. 7, 8 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (liberality of amendment applies to both rules 13(f)
and 15).
" "Consequently since Rule 15(c) is applicable only to amendments made pursuant to Rule 15(a) ....
amendments made pursuant to Rule 13(f) do not relate
back to original pleadings." 3'72 F.2d at 91 (citations omitted).
"' 1A W. BARRON & A. HOLTZomF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 402,
at 26 (Supp. 1969) [hereinafter cited as BARRON & HOLTZOFF].
"'See Keckley v. Payton, 157 F. Supp. 820, 822-23 (N.D.W. Va. 1958);
Sullivan v. Hoover, 6 F.R.D. 513 (D.D.C. 1947).
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purpose of relation back is to avoid the statute of limitations. Even more
persuasive, however, was the fact that the drafters of the federal rules gave
no indication that rule 13 (f) amendments were to relate back under rule
15 (c).16 Indeed, the court in Stoner might have reasoned had the drafters
intended for rule 13 (f) amendments to relate back they could have easily
made provision for such an effect. The fact that no such provision was considered, or even commented upon, is some evidence that the rules should not
be so used, especially in light of the strong substantive policy reflected by
the statute of limitations. There is something inherently unfair in allowing the defendant to withhold his claim until the statutory period has
expired, and then permit him to assert it in an amendment that relates
back to the date of the pleading. It seems most improper when one considers that the defendant could have easily brought suit as a party plaintiff
long before the statute of limitations expired on his claim for relief. The
court in Stoner thus concluded that the federal rules were not designed to
protect defendants who had slept upon their rights.
While the decision in Stoner appears correct on the surface, it is submitted that a more extensive analysis might have led that court to reach
the opposite result" and would indicate that Poffinberger was correctly
decided. One reason so few defendants have attempted to assert statutorily barred counterclaims through use of rule 15 (c) is that most states
hold that the statute of limitations is tolled by the filing of the complaint 1
As a result, in most instances resort to rule 15 (c) is not necessary. Fur-

" See

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY

DIRAFT OF RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED
STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (May 1936);
ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROPOSED RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (April

1937).

"'The court in Stoner cited Barron and Holtzoff as authority for the proposi-

tion

that rule 15(c) applies only to rule 15(a) amendments. Barron and Holtzoff

does impart that "[t]he question whether an amendment relates back under rule
15(c) is of importance only with regard to those amendments made pursuant to
rule 15(a)." 1A BARRON AND HOLTzOFF § 448, at 760 (1960). However, a proper
reading of that section indicates that the authors were speaking of excluding ride
15(b) from the operation of the relation back provision. Id. Indeed, Barron and
Holtzoff's review of Stoner provides that "[t]his is not a necessary reading of
the rules, and if the other tests of relation back are satisfied, the doctrine seems
as desirable applied to counterclaims as to any other amended pleading." Id.
§448, at 74 (Supp. 1969).
18E.g., Azada v. Carson, 252 F. Supp. 988, 989 (D. Hawaii 1966) (citing
Hawaii law); E.W. Bliss Co. v. Cold Metal Process Co., 156 F. Supp. 63, 66 (N.D.
Ohio 1957) (citing Ohio law), af'd, 285 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 911 (1961); Tom Reed Gold Mines v. Brady, 55 Ariz. 133, 139, 99

P.2d 97, 100 (1940).
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thermore, reliance upon cases19 holding that rule 13 has no application
to barred counterclaims seems unwarranted; no attempt was made in those
cases to bring the counterclaim within the scope of rule 15 (c). Rather,
the cases focused upon whether the language of rule 13 (c) 2" allowed the
counterclaims to be asserted regardless of whether the statute of limitations had run.
The absence of an express federal rule covering relation back of
counterclaims may have improperly influenced the court in Stoner. Rule
15 (c) was obviously designed to alleviate the problems encountered when
the statutory period elapsed after a pleading was filed, leaving the claims
and defenses arising from a single transaction inadequately reflected. The
drafters of the federal rules allowed amended pleadings setting forth these
omitted matters to relate back, recognizing that once an opposing party
has been put on notice as to the transaction being litigated the purpose
of the statute of limitations has been served. 1 Unlike in Stoner, the court
in Poffinberger recognized that allowing counterclaims to relate back
comports to this policy of notification equally as well as other amended
pleadings. If the policy of the federal rules is to decide cases on their
merits and not on technicalities, 2 the statute of limitations should not bar
defendant's same-transaction-counterclaims.
The logical place to begin an interpretive inquiry into the correct
meaning of the federal rules is the language of the rules themselves. Rule
13(f) states that the "[defendant] may by leave of court set up the
counterclaim by amendment."
Rule 15(c) requires only that an
"amendment" arise from the same transaction as the original pleading.24
There is nothing in the language of the two rules to indicate that the term
"amendment" in rule 15(c) does not apply to amendments asserting
omitted counterclaims under rule 13 (f). There is certainly no indication
that rule 15(c) applies only to amendments made pursuant to rule
15(a).5 Moreover, rule 13(f) amendments meet the requirements of
" Keckley v. Payton, 157 F. Supp. 820, 822-23 (N.D.W. Va. 1958); Sullivan
v. Hoover, 6 F.R.D. 513 (D.D.C. 1947).
" FED. R. Civ. P. 13(c) states in part that "[a] counterclaim may ... diminish
or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party."
" See generally F. JAMEs, CIVIL PRocEDuRE § 10.17 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as JAMEs].
"2Copeland Motor Co. v. General Motors Corp., 199 F.2d 566, 567-68 (5th Cir.
1952).
"8 FED. R. Civ. P. 13(f).
"Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
" "If ...

[rule 15(c)] was meant to encompass less than all the amendments
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rule 15(c) that the claim set up by amendment arise from the same
transaction as the original pleading. If, as in Poffinberger, the counterclaim arises from the same occurrence set forth in the original pleading,
the plaintiff has the required notice and relation back should be allowed.
When careful examination of the language of the rules is combined with
the policy of liberal construction of the amending provisions,20 it is clear
that the decision in Poffinberger, rejecting the reasoning of the court
in Stoner,2 was correct. Rule 13(f) amendments should be allowed to
relate back under rule 15 (c).28
There is at least one narrow situation where the relation back theory
of Poffinberger may prove unworkable: where the plaintiff's complaint
is filed so near the expiration date of the statute of limitations, that the
answer, even though timely under rule 12 (a),29 is served after the statute
has run. 0 A rule 13(f) amendment asserting a barred counterclaim
and relating back to the time of the answer, as in Poffinberger,would still
be barred by the statute of limitations. In order to alleviate his plight,
the defendant could urge that since the counterclaim asserted in his
amended pleading arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence with which the suit is concerned, the court should interpret "original
pleading" in rule 15(c) to mean the plaintiff's complaint, not the defendant's answer. From a policy standpoint, the court should recognize
that the purpose of the statute of limitations is to keep stale litigation
out of the court.3" It should be aimed at barring untimely lawsuits, rather
authorized by the Federal Rules, one would expect some indication of that fact with-

in the Rule." 49 F.R.D. at 11.
2 Commissioner v. Finley, 265 F.2d 885, 888 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
834 (1959).
27
It is at least plausible that the court in Stoner wanted to avoid deciding
whether relation back was substance or procedure under Erie R.R. v.Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938). This avoidance seems unnecessary in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Hannm v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), which apparently
directs a federal court to apply the federal rule of relation back. Id. at 471. See
also 3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 15.15[2] (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as
MooRE].
28 Cf. IA BARRON AND HOLTZOFF § 448, at 74 (Supp. 1969).
29 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a) states in part: "A defendant shall serve his answer
within 20 days after service of the summons and complaint...."
" Allowing the plaintiff's claim to be litigated while barring the defendant's
counterclaim might well encourage the plaintiff to utilize the statute of limitations

to avoid the defendant's counterclaims. This result is diametrically opposed to the
purpose of statutes of limitation. See e.g., Azada v. Carson, 252 F. Supp. 988, 989

(D. Hawaii 1966) (complaint was filed two days before the statute ran). See gen-

erally JAmEs § 10.17, at 489.
" Cf. JAmEs § 10.17, at 489.
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than justiciable issues still capable of litigation."2 The statute was designed to "assure fairness... 'by preventing surprises through the revival
of claims which had been allowed to slumber. .

. .' ""

If it were held that

the term "original pleading" in rule 15 (c) meant the plaintiff's complaint,
the rule in some jurisdictions that the statute of limitations is not tolled
by the filing of the complaint3 4 would be completely circumvented. The
federal court would not only be able to adjudicate a complete controversy
arising out of the same transaction, but the plaintiff would be precluded
from using a statute initially designed to protect defending parties 5 as an
offensive weapon.3 6
If the complaint is interpreted as the "original pleading" for purposes
of rule 15(c), consequently tolling the statute of limitations, the issue
becomes that of protecting the plaintiff from an intentionally dilatory
defendant. Rule 13 (f) demands that defendant's failure to assert timely
an omitted counterclaim result from oversight, inadvertence, or excusable
neglect; leave to amend will not be granted if failure to assert the counterclaim was for a frivolous reason. On the other hand, if defendant's
failure to raise the counterclaim was truly inadvertent, as in Poffinberger,
leave to amend will be granted, but the plaintiff will not be prejudiced,
"at least not in a way the statute of limitations was designed to protect.137
Although federal court defendants can rely on the court's interpretation in Poffinberger of the relationship between rules 13(f) and 15(c),
the impact of the decision may have far-reaching consequences for those
states that adhere to the view that the statute is not tolled by the filing
of the complaint and have adopted rules of procedure similar to the federal
rules. In North Carolina, for example, the cases suggest that the statute
of limitations continues to run after the filing of the complaint." What
United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 72 (1956).
'3 Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965).
"Many jurisdictions hold that the filing of the complaint tolls the statute of
limitations only as to claims for recoupment, i.e., the defendant can assert a
claim arising out of the same transaction to prevent or reduce the plaintiff's
recovery, but he cannot affirmatively recover. See, e.g., Bull v. United States, 295

U.S. 247, 262 (1935) ; Harvey Coal Corp. v. Smith, 268 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. 1954).
* Burnett v. New York Cent R.R., 3'80 U.S. 424, 428 (1965).

See generally Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 277 F.2d 615, 623 (10th

Cir.873
1960);
JAmZEs § 10.17.
MooREJ
15.15[2], at 1022. See also JAm~s § 10.17.
" B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Spencer, 268 N.C. 1, 149 S.E.2d 570 (1966) ; Speas
v. Ford, 253 N.C. 770, 117 S.E.2d 784 (1961) ; cf. North Carolina Cotton Grower's
Co-op. v. Tillery, 201 N.C. 531, 533, 160 S.E. 767, 768 (1931) (dictum). Contra,
Norfolk & S.R.R. v. Dill, 171 N.C. 176, 177, 88 S.E. 144i 145 (1916) ; Brumble v.
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result can be anticipated when a defendant fails to assert a counterclaim
upon which the statutory period has elapsed? If the North Carolina courts
adopt the rationale used in Poffinberger, the statute will be effectively
tolled with respect to the counterclaim the defendant has failed to allege.
Rule 13 (f) " of the North Carolina rules is to identical to the federal rule.
However, North Carolina rule 15 (c) 4" is somewhat different. It provides
that
[A] claim asserted in an amended pleading is deemed to have been
interposed at the time the claim in the original pleading was interposed, unless the original pleading does not give notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, to be
41
proved pursuant to the amended pleading.
The defendant will probably be allowed to assert a statutorily barred
counterclaim if his answer apprises the plaintiff of the transaction upon
which his claim rests.' The official comment to the North Carolina rules
indicates such a result by stating that "[t] he amended pleading will ...
relate back ... even if the new pleading constitutes a new cause of action,
provided that the defending party had originally been placed on notice of
the events involved."'
In those jurisdictions in which the Poffinbqrger rationale is adopted,
many of the vestiges of a harsh, inequitable, and often confusing rule can
be eliminated. Subject to rule 13(f) safeguards, the plaintiff no longer
will be allowed recovery while the defendant's claim for relief arising from
the same transaction is barred by the statute of limitations. Upon a showing of inadvertence or excusable neglect, the defendant should be allowed
to assert an omitted counterclaim by amendment, and the amendment
Brown, 71 N.C. 513, 516 (1874). See generally 1 McINTOsH, NORTH CAROLINA
PRAcTIcE AND PROCEDuRE § 327, at 206 (2d ed. 1956).
"N.C.R. Civ. P. 13 (f).
"N.C.R. Civ. P. 15(c).
'1 d. North Carolina rule 15(c) was modeled after the New York procedural

rule governing amended pleadings, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §203(e) (McKinney
1963). That rule has been interpreted as allowing the relation back of barred
counterclaims if an affirmative defense is alleged in the answer. Such a defense
would give the plaintiff notice of the transactions to be proved in the amended
pleading. A Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 39 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 412-

13 (1965).

" Based upon New York's experience under a similar rule, North Carolina
courts may allow relation back of barred counterclaims only when the answer
has set forth an affirmative defense alleging the precise conduct to be proved in
the amended pleading. See Nichimen & Co. v. Framen Steel Supply Co., 44 Misc.
2d 260, 253 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
"'N.C.R. Civ. P. 15, comment (c).
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should be allowed to relate back to the "original pleading" to avoid the
bar of the statute. "[I]t is a natural and salutary development to toll
the statute of limitations on all causes of action arising out of the transaction initially pleaded, regardless of legal theory."44
C. H. POPE

Civil Procedure-Remittitur-Remitting Parties' Right to Cross-Appeal
With its recent decision in Mulkerin v. Somerset Tire Service, Inc.1
New Jersey allied itself with Wisconsin' in permitting a plaintiff who had
accepted remittitur in the trial court to obtain appellate review of the
lower court's determination of the damage issue by means of a cross-appeal.
In so doing, New Jersey broke with widely accepted precedent at common
law which denies all opportunities to the remitting party to complain on
appeal. 3 Although four states currently provide the remitting party with
some method for review by statute or rule of civil procedure,4 only Wis"McLaughlin, Practice Commentary, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 203(e) (McKinney 1963).
1 110 N.J. Super. 173, 264 A.2d 748 (App. Div. 1970).
2
See, e.g., Plesko v. City of Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 2d 210, 120 N.W.2d 130

(1963).
8

Conlin v. Southern Pac. R.R. 182 P. 71 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1919); Sergeant
v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co., 244 Iowa 185, 52 N.W.2d 86 (1952); Iron R.R. v.
Mowrey, 36 Ohio St. 418 (1881).
'NEB. REv. STAr. § 25-1929 (1943):
Whenever the court shall direct a remittitur in any action, and the same is
made, and the party for whose benefit it is made shall appeal said action,
then the party remitting shall not be barred from maintaining that the remittitur should not have required either in whole or in part.
N.Y. Civ. PR.Ac. LAw § 5501 (McKinney 1963):
(a) An appeal from a final judgment brings up for review:
5. a verdict after a trial by jury as of right, when the final judgment was
entered in a different amount pursuant to the respondent's stipulation
on a motion to set aside the verdict as excessive or inadequate; the
appellate court may increase such judgment to a sum not exceeding the
verdict or reduce it to a sum not less than the verdict.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-118 (1955):
In all jury trials had in civil actions, after the verdict has been rendered,
and on motion for a new trial, when the trial judge is of the opinion that the
verdict in favor of a party should be reduced, and a remittitur is suggested
by him on that account, with the proviso that in case the party in whose favor
the verdict has been rendered refuses to make the remittitur a new trial
will be awarded, the party in whose favor such verdict has been rendered
may make such remittitur under protest, and appeal from the action of the
trial judge to the Court of Appeals; and if, in the opinion of said Court of

